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THE BRIGHT LINE’S DARK SIDE:   
PRE-CHARGE ATTACHMENT OF THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Steven J. Mulroy

 
Abstract: In this Article, Professor Mulroy discusses a current circuit split over whether 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can ever attach prior to a prosecutor filing a formal 
charge (i.e., an indictment or information). Relying on language in several Supreme Court 
opinions, some lower courts impose a bright-line rule stating that unless there has been such 
a formal charge (or unless the defendant has appeared before a judge), the right can never 
attach, in part because the Sixth Amendment’s text refers to a “criminal prosecution” and an 
“accused.” This rule can lead to harsh results—e.g., where a prosecutor takes advantage of an 
uncounseled defendant in pre-indictment plea negotiations, or where defense counsel in such 
negotiations provides unprofessional service, but there can be no claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  
The Article argues against a bright-line rule. Professor Mulroy argues that a proper 
understanding of the Amendment’s text, the language of the relevant Supreme Court 
opinions explaining the underlying reasons for right to counsel protection, and pragmatic 
considerations of basic fairness all support a pre-charge right to counsel in at least some 
circumstances. He proposes a new rule: the right attaches whenever a prosecutor is involved 
in substantive communications with a defendant, either directly or through defense counsel. 
This rule would apply to: pre-charge plea and other negotiations; subpoenaed grand jury 
testimony; pretrial depositions taken pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; and similar situations. It derives analogous support from the “no contact” ethical 
requirement of Model Rule 4.2, and, as applied to custodial interrogations, harmonizes Sixth 
Amendment doctrine with Fifth Amendment case law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider three situations involving potential ineffective assistance of 
counsel
1
 claims by criminal defendants. 
1. After the defendant is indicted, his attorney makes a minor but 
ultimately significant mistake in plea negotiations—say, she properly 
informs her client of the legal consequences of a guilty plea, but 
inaccurately describes the immigration consequences for the defendant, 
who is not a U.S. citizen. 
2. Prior to indictment, the defense attorney neglects to inform the 
defendant of a favorable plea offer. The defendant materially suffers by 
not taking the plea offer—e.g., by receiving a substantially more severe 
sentence than he would otherwise have obtained. 
3. Prior to indictment, the defense attorney fails to inform the 
defendant of a valid and obvious defense. She thus improperly advises 
her client to take a disadvantageous plea offer, and the defendant suffers 
as a result. 
Under current law, only the defendant in Situation 1
2
 can clearly 
obtain relief through a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
                                                     
1. “Ineffective assistance of counsel” claims assert that criminal defense counsel fell below a 
minimum level of professional competence, thus depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment 
right to the assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683, 686 (1984).  
2. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that counsel engaged in ineffective 
assistance for failing to inform defendant that guilty plea triggered deportation).  
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even though the defense counsel’s legal error in Situation 1 is less 
serious than in the other examples. In many federal circuits, defendants 
in Situations 2 and 3 cannot obtain relief because of a prevailing bright-
line rule about when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches,
3
 a 
rule which the Sixth Circuit has criticized as “exalt[ing] form over 
substance”4 and inconsistent with “the realities of present-day criminal 
prosecutions.”5  Under this bright-line rule, the right to counsel must be 
triggered by either: (1) a formal charge from the prosecutor,
6
 either in 
the form of an indictment or information; or (2) an appearance before a 
judge, as in arraignment or first appearance.
7
 
This rule stems from language in United States v. Gouveia,
8
 where the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches 
only after “the initiation of . . . criminal proceedings.”9 But the language 
used by the Court in Gouveia and subsequent cases actually does not 
compel strict adherence to the bright-line rule.
10
 The Court’s description 
                                                     
3. See infra Part III.  
4. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 486 (1964)).  
5. Turner v. United States, No. 15-6060, 2017 WL 603848, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2017) (citing a 
draft version of this Article).  
6. When a police officer initially arrests and books a suspect, he typically is said to “charge” the 
arrestee with a crime, both by orally informing the suspect at the time of arrest the crime(s) of which 
he is charged, and by filling out paperwork during booking. That is not the sense in which the Court 
(or this Article) uses the word “charge.” Herein, “charge” (often modified as “formal charge”) refers 
to legal papers filed in court by the prosecutor that initiate judicial proceedings. See Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1986); United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(holding that criminal complaint document filed by law enforcement agents did not trigger the right 
to counsel). These normally take the form of an indictment or information. See id. at 83. They may 
or may not take the form of a criminal complaint. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977) 
(mentioning, in holding that a preliminary hearing triggered the right, that a criminal complaint had 
already been filed in court); Boskic, 545 F.3d at 83 (holding that criminal complaint could not 
trigger the right, because, inter alia, such complaints do not “require, by statute or rule, the 
participation of a prosecutor.”). 
7. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 430; United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1984). In most 
of the cases discussed in Moran and Gouveia, the defendant did not appear before a magistrate at 
the relevant time, so the only issue regarding the attachment of the right to counsel is the presence 
or absence of a formal charge. See generally Moran, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 
(1984). For this reason, this Article refers often to “pre-indictment” attachment as shorthand for 
attachment taking place before a formal charge, and in the absence of any appearance before a 
judge. Similarly, while an information, or possibly, a criminal complaint might suffice just as well 
as a grand jury indictment for these purposes, this Article refers to “pre-indictment” and “post-
indictment” actions as shorthand.  
8. 467 U.S. 180 (1984). 
9. Id. at 189. The Court in Gouveia relied on a plurality opinion in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
689 (1972).  
10. See infra section II.B and Part IV.  
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of the underlying purpose of the right to counsel, and the reason for 
drawing the line where it is, support recognition of the right even before 
an indictment, information, or appearance before a judge, at least in 
some circumstances.
11
 Specifically, the right should be recognized at a 
minimum in pre-indictment plea negotiations, and also in other 
situations where the prosecutor has direct contact with the defense and 
the defendant needs expert legal advice to know how to respond. 
The circuit courts are split on this issue. The Fifth,
12
 Ninth,
13
 Tenth,
14
 
Eleventh,
15
 and D.C. Circuits
16
 have derived and strictly enforced a 
bright-line rule. The First,
17
 Third,
18
 Fourth,
19
 and Seventh
20
 Circuits 
have all rejected the bright-line rule, either in holdings or in dicta. 
Several district courts have also rejected the bright-line rule.
21
 The 
                                                     
11. See infra section I.B.  
12. United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until or after the time formal adversary judicial proceedings have been 
initiated.”). 
13. United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 675 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the right to counsel 
did not apply pre-indictment to the target of a grand jury investigation). 
14. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting right 
to counsel with respect to evidence seized before indictment, because the right attaches only “at or 
after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings”). 
15. United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1112 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (“reject[ing] . . . out of 
hand” ineffective-assistance claim by defendant subpoenaed to testify before grand jury prior to 
indictment) (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).  
16. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (ruling that admission of 
conversations between defendant and coconspirator taped by FBI after defendant was represented 
by counsel but before any formal charges did not violate right to counsel, because only the 
“accused” have a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment’s plain text).  
17. Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995) (recognizing the “possibility” that the 
right might attach before formal charges, indictment, or arraignment, although in “extremely 
limited” circumstances).  
18. Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892–93 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (right 
to counsel attached after defendant was arrested and held in jail for more than a week but prior to 
the filing of an information by the district attorney and prior to arraignment). 
19. United States v. Burgess, No. 96-4505, 1998 WL 141157, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 1998) (per 
curiam) (noting that the Supreme Court “refused to draw a line at indictment”) (citing Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977)).  
20. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is merely a 
rebuttable presumption that the right does not attach before formal charges are filed).  
21. See United States v. Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (D. Or. 2010) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached at pre-indictment plea negotiation, because the right “rests on 
the nature of the confrontation between the suspect-defendant and the government, rather than a 
‘mechanical’ inquiry into whether the government has formally obtained an indictment”); United 
States v. Fernandez, No. 98 CR. 961 JSM, 2000 WL 534449 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2000) (the right to 
counsel attached when the defendant was represented and his attorney failed to inform him prior to 
the filing of formal charges of the possibility of a cooperation agreement with the prosecution); 
United States v. Busse, 814 F.Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
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Eighth Circuit has given differing indications,
22
 as has the Second 
Circuit.
23
 Most tellingly, the Sixth Circuit has opined that, while it 
interprets Supreme Court case law as indicating a bright-line rule, it is 
based on an untenable distinction, leading to “a triumph of the letter over 
the spirit of the law.”24 
There has been relatively little scholarship on this issue.
25
 The issue is 
a significant one, for pre-indictment plea negotiations are not 
uncommon.
26
 They are particularly common when there has been a 
charge in one court system, such as state or tribal, prior to prosecution in 
a different court system, such as federal.
27
 They are becoming more 
common with the increased use of joint federal-state task forces in recent 
decades.
28
 Cases raising the issue of whether the right can attach to pre-
                                                     
had attached when, during “pre-charge negotiations” the government had “committed itself to 
prosecut[ion]”); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1319–20 (D. Del. 1981) (the right to 
counsel attached during plea negotiations which occurred prior to the commencement of adversary 
judicial proceedings).  
22. Compare Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880, 896 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bye, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Eighth Circuit has used language suggesting it would adopt the bright line approach.”), and United 
States v. Ingle, 157 F.3d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[L]ooking to the initiation of adversary 
judicial proceedings, far from being mere formalism, is fundamental to the proper application of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986)), with 
United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 708, 715–16 (8th Cir. 2002) (right to counsel attached prior to 
federal indictment where defendant had been arraigned in separate Indian tribal court proceeding on 
the same charge).  
23. Compare United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (no attachment of right to 
counsel where government placed cooperating witness in defendant’s cell after state charges had 
been filed but before filing federal charges), with United States v. Mills, 412 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 
2005) (right attached prior to federal indictment where challenged police interrogation occurred 
after state court prosecution on the same charge).  
24. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Turner v. United States, 
No. 15-6060, 2017 WL 603848 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2017) (criticizing the rule but acknowledging that 
the court is bound by the ruling in Moody).   
25. See Brandon K. Breslow, Signs of Life in the Supreme Court’s Uncharted Territory: Why the 
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel Should Attach to Pre-Indictment Plea Bargaining, 62 FED. 
LAW. 35, 35 (2015) (reviewing the circuit split and arguing against a bright-line rule).  
26. See William L. Gardner & David S. Rifkind, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining, 7 CRIM. 
JUST. 14, 16 (1992); David N. Yellen, Two Cheers for a Tale of Three Cities, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
567, 569–70 (1992).  
27. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2007); Mills, 412 F.3d at 329; 
Bird, 287 F.3d at 715; Mapp, 170 F.3d at 334–35; United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1104–
06 (9th Cir. 1992).  
28. Turner, No. 15-6060, 2017 WL 603848, at *9.  For examples of cases, see United States v. 
Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2008) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel not violated by joint 
task force activity); Morris, 470 F.3d at 598–99 (Sixth Amendment violated through pre-indictment 
ineffective assistance in joint federal-state task force case). On the increasing use of such task 
forces, see Robin Campbell, Issues of Consistency in the Federal Death Penalty, 14 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 52, 53–54 (2001) (federal-state cooperation in capital cases is on the rise, and frequently takes 
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indictment plea discussions or in related situations will “continue to be 
litigated . . . until the Supreme Court explicitly resolves the issue.”29 
Further, the issue is of recent vintage. While the Court for decades has 
been stating generally that the right to counsel attaches at formal charge, 
during those decades there has been no occasion to examine that 
potential rule’s impact on ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
involving plea negotiations, for the simple reason that it was not until 
2012 that the Court expressly held that an ineffective assistance theory 
could even apply to plea negotiations.
30
 
This Article will explain why, as a matter of first principles, 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and basic reasons of 
procedural fairness, the circuit split should be resolved in favor of 
recognizing the attachment of the right to counsel, even prior to the 
filing by the prosecutor of a formal charge (or appearance before a 
magistrate), in certain circumstances. Part I provides background on 
Supreme Court doctrine on this question. It explains why the language of 
earlier Supreme Court cases, properly understood, does not preclude 
such recognition of the right. It also explains how the precise scenario 
posed here, about ineffective assistance of counsel in pre-indictment plea 
bargains, is a relatively new issue not contemplated by that older 
Supreme Court precedent. Part II examines the circuit split and the state 
of the law in the lower federal courts, and how the varying opinions’ use 
of Supreme Court precedent illustrates that such precedent lends itself to 
more than one interpretation. Part III explains why flexibility is 
warranted in the rule regarding initial attachment of the right, and 
proposes that the right attach pre-indictment when the prosecutor has 
had adversarial contact with the accused, either directly or via defense 
counsel. Part IV explains the policy advantages of the proposed rule, 
including, inter alia, avoiding improper incentives for prosecutor, and 
achieving consistency with the analogous ethical “no-contact” rules. 
                                                     
the form of joint state and federal task forces); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The 
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 711 n.291 (1997) (“state-federal task 
forces abound,” with such cooperation becoming “increasingly commonplace”); John C. Jeffries & 
John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 
HASTINGS L. J. 1095, 1124–25 (1995) (noting then-recent trend of increasing use of such task forces 
in organized crime cases, where they “are now the rule, rather than the exception”). 
29. See Breslow, supra note 25, at 38–39.  
30. See infra section II.C; Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).  
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I.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
A.  General  
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy the right to,” inter alia, (1) “a speedy and public 
trial”; (2) “an impartial jury”; (3) notice of the charges; (4) the right of 
confrontation of adverse witnesses and compulsory process; and, finally, 
(5) “the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”31 The right to counsel 
uncontroversially includes the right for a paying client to bring a 
qualified attorney of his choice to the trial and related proceedings,
32
 as 
well as the right of an indigent defendant facing jail time to have the 
prosecuting government provide a lawyer at its expense.
33
 But the 
Supreme Court has also indicated that the right to counsel includes the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel.
34
 
Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v. 
Washington,
35
 the Court has found that where defense counsel’s 
assistance falls below a minimum standard of professional conduct, the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is 
violated.
36
 A defendant so injured can obtain relief if he can establish 
both: (1) that his counsel, through identified acts or omissions, fell 
below a standard of reasonable competence; and (2) that there is a 
“reasonable probability” that but for such defective performance, the 
outcome of the hearing, trial, or sentencing would have been materially 
different.
37
 
The Court has also interpreted the right to include having a lawyer 
present to assist the defendant at various “critical stages” of the criminal 
justice process, even before trial.
38
 Many of the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel cases involved the admissibility of a piece of evidence 
allegedly obtained in violation of the right to counsel. One such line of 
                                                     
31.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has emphasized the words 
“prosecutions” and “accused” in interpreting when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. 
See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.  
32. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016).  
33. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1972). 
34. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  
35. Id. at 668. 
36. Id. at 688.  
37. Id. at 694.  
38. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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cases involves the use of “lineups” to have a witness identify a suspect.39 
Another even more common line of cases involves admissions from a 
defendant obtained through interrogation conducted outside the presence 
of defense counsel.
40
 In cases like these, where the defendant argues that 
the challenged evidence should be excluded because it was obtained in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, a crucial question was whether the 
Sixth Amendment right has even “attached” at the point in time in which 
the evidence was obtained.
41
 Indeed, most of the Supreme Court cases 
clarifying when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches are cases 
involving the admissibility of evidence. 
In such cases, the Supreme Court, drawing on the text of the Sixth 
Amendment, has emphasized that the right to counsel applies only in 
“criminal prosecution[s],” and only to “the accused.”42 For there to be a 
“criminal prosecution” against an “accused,” the Court has reasoned, a 
formal accusation must be made: the prosecutor must file charges, or 
else such charges must be presented to a magistrate.
43
 Thus, unless the 
defendant has been brought before a judge on the charge in question, as 
in an arraignment or first appearance,
44
 the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not apply until the prosecutor brings formal charges.
45
 
The Court first drew this line in Kirby v. Illinois,
46
 when it rejected a 
claim for relief by a defendant arguing that he had a right to have an 
attorney present at a post-arrest, pre-indictment lineup.
47
 In a plurality 
opinion, Justice Stewart wrote, in oft-quoted language, that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches “at or after the initiation of 
adversary judicial proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, 
                                                     
39. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 
969 (7th Cir. 1992).  
40. See Moody, 206 F.3d at 611 (defendant made incriminating statements to police prior to the 
filing of charges); United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 669 (9th Cir. 2000) (defendant sought to 
suppress statements made to undercover agent prior to the filing of formal charges); Matteo v. 
Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 884 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (defendant sought 
suppression of recorded statements made to a friend while in jail prior to the filing of an information 
or arraignment). 
41. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986).  
42. Id. at 430; see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). 
43. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 429–31 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 & n.16 (1986)).  
44. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (initial appearance before a 
magistrate was enough to trigger attachment of the right, regardless of the presence or absence of 
participation by the prosecutor).  
45. Maine, 474 U.S. at 180. 
46. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
47. Id. at 689–90.  
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preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”48 The 
plurality explained that this was more than “mere formalism” to use the 
formal “initiation of judicial criminal proceedings” as “the starting 
point,” for: 
[I]t is only then the government has committed itself to 
prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government 
and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds 
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, 
and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural 
criminal law.
49
 
Twelve years later, a majority of the Court reaffirmed this reasoning. 
In United States v. Gouveia, a prison inmate suspected of a crime was 
brought from the general prison population to administrative segregation 
for interrogation without defense counsel present. The Court held that 
the prisoner had no right to have counsel present during the 
interrogation, because the right to counsel had not yet attached.
50
 The 
Gouveia Court quoted the above language from Kirby, as well as the 
Court’s statement in a post-Kirby case stating that the right attaches 
“when the accused is confronted with both the intricacies of the law and 
the advocacy of the public prosecutor.”51 As the Court definitively put it 
in Gouveia, again quoting Kirby, the right attaches only “at or after the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.”52 Later Supreme Court cases followed this rule.53 
                                                     
48. Id. at 689.  
49. Id. (emphasis added). 
50. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984).  
51. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 188–89 (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973)).  
52. Id. at 188. 
53. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167–68 (2001) (citing McNeil language below, and 
rejecting argument that exclusion could apply to admissions concerning uncharged offenses which 
were “factually related” to a charged offense); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1991) 
(because right attached only “after initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by 
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,” Sixth 
Amendment required exclusion of only the incriminating statements made about offenses which had 
been formally charged, and not of statements relating to uncharged offenses); Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (right to counsel does not attach until either a formal charge or appearance 
before a judge; thus, law enforcement’s pre-indictment, uncounseled interrogation of suspect whose 
retained lawyer was trying to reach him did not violate the Sixth Amendment); Maine v. Moulton, 
474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1984) (admissions elicited in uncounseled interrogation would be 
admissible for as-yet-unindicted offenses, and inadmissible for offenses already charged).  
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B.  Purpose of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has discussed the 
underlying purposes behind the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
resulting guidelines for drawing the line at which the right attaches, 
using language which is amenable to a more functional, less formalistic 
approach. The language employed suggests two broad themes: (1) 
preventing the unaided lay defendant from being unfairly overwhelmed 
by the complexities of a criminal prosecution; and (2) recognizing the 
transition from investigation to accusation.
54
 
1.  Protecting the Lay Defendant 
In Gouveia itself, the Court said that the “core purpose”55 of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, in the specific context of determining 
when the right attaches, is “assuring aid at trial and at ‘critical’ pretrial 
proceedings when the accused is confronted with the intricacies of 
criminal law or with the expert advocacy of the public prosecutor, or 
both.”56 Crucially, the Court has stated that the right to counsel “exists to 
protect the accused during trial-type confrontations with the 
prosecutor.”57 The jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the 
average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself” when brought up against “experienced and learned counsel” for 
the prosecution.
58
 When the accused is confronted “by the procedural 
system, or by his expert adversary,” such confrontation “might well 
settle the accused’s fate and render the trial itself a mere formality.”59 
This language certainly seems to apply to plea negotiations, whether pre- 
or post-indictment: because the negotiations might lead to a plea, they 
                                                     
54. Admittedly, the language in Gouveia and later cases could be read as shutting the door on any 
attachment of the right prior to formal charge or appearance before a judge. Justice Stevens, 
concurring in Gouveia, disapprovingly read the Gouveia majority opinion as going so far as to 
“foreclose the possibility that the right to counsel might under some circumstances attach prior to 
the formal initiation of judicial proceedings.” Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
For the purposes of this Article, the distinction may be more semantic than real. If the opinions can 
be read as allowing extension to certain pre-indictment situations, they should be so interpreted. If 
they cannot, then the rule should be replaced with a more expansive, flexible rule. See infra section 
IV.C.  
55. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189 (citing Ash, 413 U.S. at 309). 
56. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).  
57. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).  
58. Id. at 189 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938)).  
59. Id. (citing Ash, 413 U.S. at 310; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).  
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may very well “settle the accused’s fate,” and render the trial itself not 
just a mere formality, but wholly unnecessary.  
In analogous contexts, the Court has emphasized the salience of the 
need for the untutored defendant to have a lawyer’s expert assistance in 
navigating the intricacies of the criminal justice process. For example, in 
judging the propriety of police interrogations under the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination and the related right to 
be given warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,
60
 the Court has recognized 
a “Fifth Amendment right to counsel” in addition to a “Fifth 
Amendment right to silence.”61 Invocation of this Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel, by asking for a lawyer during custodial interrogation, 
affords the accused the greatest possible protection against interrogation: 
all questioning must cease, and cannot resume (outside the presence of 
defense counsel) regarding the crime of arrest, or any other crime, unless 
and until the suspect himself initiates substantive discussion of the 
investigation.
62
 This protection, broader than that afforded someone who 
merely invokes the Fifth Amendment right to silence by asking for 
questioning to cease,
63
 exists because a suspect asking for a lawyer is 
presumed to consider himself “unable to deal with the pressures of 
custodial interrogation without legal assistance.”64 The underlying 
rationale is that fundamental fairness requires that a defendant should 
not have to deal with sophisticated law enforcement officers without the 
aid of a lawyer. So too with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: 
where an accused has to deal with a sophisticated prosecutor, the 
interests underlying the right are triggered.
65
 
                                                     
60. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, procedural safeguards are required: the defendant “must be warned prior 
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against 
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford 
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires”). 
61. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 685, 692 (1988). The existence of a separate 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, parallel to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the 
interrogation context, can cause terminological confusion. This Article usually specifies “Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel,” but, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, the phrase “right 
to counsel” refers to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
62. Id. at 680–81 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1988)). 
63. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975) (holding that if only the Fifth 
Amendment right to silence is invoked, questioning must cease, but can resume several hours later 
at law enforcement’s initiative provided Miranda warnings are reissued).  
64. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683. 
65. Granted, the analogy drawn here is not perfect. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
recognized in Roberson protects a defendant from custodial interrogation even by non-lawyer police 
officers, whereas the right argued for in this Article is to be protected from substantive dealings with 
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2.  Transition from Investigation to Accusation 
The other formulation of the right’s starting point concerns the 
movement from investigation to prosecution. An example comes from 
the Gouveia Court’s citation of the plurality opinion in Kirby,66 which 
focuses on whether “the government has committed itself to prosecute, 
and . . . the adverse positions of government and defendant have 
solidified.”67 
By contrast, for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment can attach as 
early as arrest, prior to the filing of any formal charges.
68
 But the Court 
in Gouveia distinguished the speedy trial right from the right to counsel. 
The former exists “to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and 
the presence of unresolved criminal charges,” and thus the clock indeed 
can start ticking with a pre-indictment arrest; but the latter exists to 
protect the accused during “confrontations with the prosecutor.”69 
But those two recognized characteristics of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel—(1) confronting the defendant with an “expert 
adversary” and the “intricacies of the law,” and (2) having the 
government “committed . . . to prosecute,” rendering the “adverse 
positions” of government and accused “solidified”—can manifest in 
situations prior to indictment as well.
70
 And at least some Supreme Court 
opinions have recognized these situations. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois,
71
 the “granddaddy” of Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel cases,
72
 the Court squarely held that the right could attach 
before formal charges were filed. In that case, the government had 
denied the defendant access to his lawyer while he was in custodial 
interrogation, but before formal charges were filed.
73
 The Court 
nonetheless held that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to 
                                                     
a prosecutor specifically. But the overall rationale—the need to provide protection to the lay 
defendant confronted with the complexities of the criminal law—is similar. 
66. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
67. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). 
68. See United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1982); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 
783, 788–89 (1977).  
69. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190.  
70. Id. at 189–90. 
71. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  
72. Escobedo and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), are generally considered to be 
foundational cases setting out the modern emergence of the use of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to combat abusive interrogation practices.  
73. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 48486.  
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counsel.
74
 The Court explained it “should make no difference” that the 
suspect had not yet been “formally indicted.”75 Once the defendant had 
been denied an opportunity to consult with counsel, it was clear that law 
enforcement had shifted from a “general investigation” of a crime to an 
effort to get the defendant “to confess his guilt.”76 The Court held that 
where the investigation “is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved 
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,” custodial 
investigation outside the presence of defense counsel violates the Sixth 
Amendment, at least where the suspect has requested and been denied 
consultation with counsel, and the police have not warned him of his 
right to silence.
77
 According to the Escobedo court, it would “exalt form 
over substance” to refuse to recognize this shift in “focus” from general 
investigation to accusation.
78
 
Since that time, the Court has reinterpreted Escobedo as a Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination privilege case rather than a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel case. In Kirby, the Court explained that 
“the Court in retrospect perceived that the ‘prime purpose’ of Escobedo 
was not to vindicate the . . . right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 
‘to guarantee the full effectuation of the privilege against self-
incrimination.”79 This explanation is somewhat difficult to credit, given 
the number of times the Escobedo opinion explicitly characterizes the 
right at issue as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
80
 But certainly 
                                                     
74. Id. at 485.  
75. Id.  
76. Id.  
77. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).  
78. Id. at 486, 490. 
79. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 
729 (1966)). The quoted language from Johnson, an interrogation case, concerned the (arguably 
distinct) issue of whether Escobedo and Miranda would be applied retroactively. Johnson, 384 U.S. 
at 729. Because the Johnson Court was considering broadly whether the protections against abusive 
custodial interrogation should reach previously pending cases, and had no occasion to consider the 
specifics of Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine, it is not clear that the (possibly shorthand) 
Johnson language about the “privilege against self-incrimination” was really intended to recast 
Escobedo from a Sixth Amendment to a Fifth Amendment case. Id. Presumably such a significant 
reinterpretation of a major Supreme Court criminal procedure case would have been accomplished 
in more than one passing reference in one clause of a single sentence of the opinion. In this 
interpretation, Kirby used the imprecise language from Johnson as a means to eliminate a 
potentially contradictory precedent, Escobedo, without explicitly overruling it. At any rate, it is 
clear that despite the language of the Escobedo opinion relying on the Sixth Amendment, it no 
longer has precedential value as a Sixth Amendment case. See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
429–30 (1986) (quoting Kirby to reaffirm that Escobedo was later reinterpreted as a Fifth 
Amendment case).  
80. See, e.g., Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479, 491; Moran, 475 U.S. at 429. 
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after Moran v. Burbine,
81
 Escobedo no longer stands for the proposition 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can attach prior to a formal 
charge or appearance before a judge. Nonetheless, the opinion’s 
criticisms of the rigid formalism of the pre/post formal charge distinction 
continue to have merit. 
3.  Objections to the Bright-Line Rule 
Other Supreme Court opinions have also acknowledged that the 
concerns underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might 
manifest prior to the filing of a formal charge. Justice Stevens, 
concurring in Gouveia, emphasized that a bright-line rule at formal 
charge was unjustified.
82
 He relied on Escobedo, as discussed above, as 
well as the language in the original Miranda opinion requiring warnings 
during custodial interrogation.
83
 In Miranda, the Court stated that 
custodial interrogation was the point at which “our adversary system of 
criminal proceedings commences,” even if the custodial interrogation 
preceded the filing of formal prosecutorial charges.
84
 Justice Stevens 
also relied on lineup cases like United States v. Wade,
85
 where the Court 
noted that under the Sixth Amendment, the accused is guaranteed 
counsel’s presence not only at trial, but “at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might 
derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”86 
Further, certain lower courts have recognized that government actions 
taken pre-indictment can still implicate the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. For example, in United States v. Stein,
87
 the government had 
coerced a private firm into canceling its policy of paying employees’ 
attorney fees as a perquisite of employment.
88
 This action in some cases 
prevented defendants from being able to afford attorneys of choice.
89
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the charges on the ground 
                                                     
81. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
82. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 193–96 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
83. Id.  
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).  
85. 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). 
86. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 226 (1967)); see also Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 199 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice 
Stevens that “in certain situations . . . . the government can transform an individual into an ‘accused’ 
without officially designating him as such through the ritual of arraignment”).  
87. United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
88. Id. at 157. 
89. Id.  
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that the government’s misconduct, though occurring before indictment, 
plainly affected the employees’ rights to counsel after they were 
indicted.
90
 This decision appropriately avoids a formalistic approach. 
However, the Second Circuit has limited its own decision in Stein to 
situations where pre-indictment government action has impermissibly 
interfered with the ability of a suspect to obtain counsel of choice.
91
 
C.  Plea Bargain Negotiations 
As noted above, the Court has said that the right to counsel attaches at 
“critical” stages of criminal proceedings.92 It has long been recognized 
that these “critical” stages of the proceedings can include steps occurring 
before trial.
93
 “Critical stages” include arraignments, post-indictment 
interrogations and lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea.
94
 Recognition 
of the latter stage, entry of a guilty plea, means the possibility of 
invalidating a guilty plea because the defense lawyer improperly advises 
his client in the decision to plead guilty.
95
 Where the defendant pleads 
guilty, there is usually a formal charge, and always a plea hearing before 
a judge.
96
 Thus, using the preexisting framework from Gouveia, Moran, 
and similar cases, the right to counsel had clearly attached. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has clarified that plea bargain 
negotiations are also one of those “critical” pretrial stages. The cases 
involved situations in which the defendant did not initially plead guilty, 
and defense counsel was ineffective for her role in having the defendant 
not accept the plea deal and plead guilty. Starting with the 2012 decision 
in Missouri v. Frye,
97
 the Court has recognized that defense counsel 
failures in plea bargain negotiations could give rise to an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.
98
 In Frye, defense counsel failed to inform 
                                                     
90. Id. at 158.  
91. United States v. Medunjanin, 752 F.3d 576, 589–90 (2d Cir. 2014).  
92. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227–28).  
93. Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (describing it as “well settled”).  
94. Id.  
95. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (holding that to satisfy effective assistance 
of counsel, “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”); Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (defendant did not provide sufficient information to show that had 
defense attorney provided accurate information regarding parole eligibility he would have pleaded 
not guilty and insisted on going to trial); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (holding 
a guilty plea based on “reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the 
ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession”).  
96. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406.  
97. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
98. Id. at 1404–05, 1408.  
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her client of a favorable plea offer; because the defendant did not accept 
that deal, he later was forced to accept another, less advantageous one.
99
 
In Lafler v. Cooper,
100
 decided the same day as Frye, defense counsel 
improperly advised the defendant to reject a favorable plea deal.
101
 In 
both cases, the Court granted relief.
102
 Because these cases are so recent, 
the earlier cases using bright-line language such as Gouveia and Moran 
had no occasion to consider pre-charge plea negotiations. 
In both Frye and Lafler, the plea negotiations at issue happened to 
have occurred after the prosecutor filed formal charges.
103
 But there is 
no reason that must always be the case: quite often, the prosecutor and 
defense can engage in plea talks prior to the filing of an indictment or 
information.
104
 
II.  LOWER COURT RULINGS 
A.  Circuits Adopting a Bright-Line Rule 
Many circuit courts addressing the question have done a 
straightforward reading of the Supreme Court language in Kirby v. 
Illinois, adopting a bright-line rule for when the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel attaches. For instance, the Second Circuit held in United 
States v. Mapp
105
 that the right to counsel did not attach when a jail plant 
was placed in the defendant’s cell to extract admissions from the 
defendant after the filing of state charges, and when the plant received 
information regarding a federal offense for which charges had not yet 
been filed.
106
 The appellate panel cited Gouveia, McNeil v. Wisconsin,
107
 
and Maine v. Moulton
108
 for the existence of a bright-line rule.
109
 For 
similar reasons, the Fifth Circuit came to the same result, despite the fact 
that at the time of the relevant interrogation, the defendants were 
                                                     
99. Id. at 1411; Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012). 
100. Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
101. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1380.  
102. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391. 
103. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1401; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.  
104. See, e.g., United States v. Busse, 814 F. Supp. 760, 761 (E.D. Wis. 1993); Chrisco v. 
Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1314 (D. Del. 1981).  
105. United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1999). 
106. Id. at 334. 
107. 501 U.S. 171 (1991). 
108. 474 U.S. 159 (1985). 
109. Mapp, 170 F.3d at 334. 
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admittedly “targets” of a criminal investigation and had been 
subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury.
110
 
In a briefer discussion, the Tenth Circuit held, relying on Kirby and 
Moulton, that the improper seizure of a record of communications 
between the defendant and his attorney did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment because it had occurred pre-indictment.
111
 This result is 
notable for the fact that the court accepted the characterization of the 
materials as privileged communications between attorney and client, yet 
found no right to counsel violation because of the bright-line rule.
112
 In 
an even briefer discussion, the D.C. Circuit rejected a right-to-counsel 
objection to pre-indictment taping of defendant’s conversations after the 
government became aware that the defendant was represented by 
counsel, citing both Gouveia and the Sixth Amendment text’s use of the 
words “accused” and “prosecution[].”113 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit 
summarily rejected a Sixth Amendment argument in a footnote citing 
Gouveia for the existence of a bright-line rule.
114
 
In the most thorough such discussion, the Ninth Circuit also adopted a 
bright-line rule in an en banc opinion, which is notable for the 
ambivalence of the majority and the spirited nature of the dissent. In 
United States v. Hayes,
115
 the Ninth Circuit, relying on Gouveia, Kirby, 
United States v. Ash,
116
 and Moulton, held that the right to counsel had 
not attached at the time of a pre-indictment interrogation, even though 
the prosecution had sent the defendant a target letter, subpoenaed him to 
testify before the grand jury, and had conducted a material witness 
deposition of the defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure Rule 15.
117
 The majority opinion admitted it was “somewhat 
queasy” about this result, because “it looks like the government is trying 
to have its cake and eat it too” by doing some things (e.g., take a 
deposition) that normally do not occur until after charges are filed, while 
                                                     
110. United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 611–12 (5th Cir. 1993). A dissent emphasized the 
violation of the professional ethics “no contact” rule, rather than the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 615–
18; infra section V.B. (discussing the “no contact” rule).  
111. United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, 149 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1998).  
112. See id.  
113. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1365–66 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  
114. United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1112 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004).  
115. 231 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000). 
116. 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
117. United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 669–71 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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doing other things (interrogation outside the presence of counsel) which 
can only occur before charges are filed.
118
 
A four-judge dissent went further, explicitly rejecting a “bright-line 
rule.”119 The dissent acknowledged and distinguished authority like 
Kirby and Gouveia, where the Supreme Court had rejected attachment of 
the right in relatively untroubling situations like police lineups, prison 
administrative detention, and failure of the police to notify a defendant 
of his attorney’s attempts to make contact.120 By contrast, the dissent 
reasoned, “in no case has the Court considered . . . anything resembling 
the court-ordered, pre-indictment taking and preserving of actual trial 
testimony[,]” which a Rule 15 deposition is designed to do.121 The 
dissent here makes a persuasive point that the simplicity of the “bright-
line rule” may fail to take proper account of unusual situations where the 
argument for a right to counsel is particularly compelling. 
B.  Circuits Rejecting the Bright-Line Rule 
Indeed, there are circuits that have adopted a more flexible approach. 
In Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion,
122
 the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the defendant’s right to counsel attached after he was 
arrested and held in jail for more than a week, but prior to the filing of 
information by the district attorney, and prior to arraignment.
123
 Matteo’s 
pre-indictment, pre-arraignment telephone conversations with a friend 
were recorded and he made incriminating statements used against him at 
trial.
124
 The court ruled that Matteo’s right to counsel had attached at the 
time of the recorded telephone conversations and that “he was entitled to 
the full protection of the Sixth Amendment.”125 Like the circuits 
enforcing the bright-line rule, the Third Circuit also relied on Kirby and 
Gouveia, but relied on the more general language about the underlying 
purposes of the right to counsel in addition to the oft-quoted language 
about “formal charge.”126 The court noted that “adversary judicial 
                                                     
118. Id. at 675–76. 
119. Id. at 679–81 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 678. 
121. Id. (emphasis in original). 
122. 171 F.3d 877 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
123. Id. at 892–93. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 893. 
126. Id. at 892. 
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proceedings” could include formal charges or a judicial hearing, but, 
quoting Gouveia: 
The right also may attach at earlier stages, when “the accused is 
confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his 
expert adversary, or both, in a situation where the results of the 
confrontation might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the 
trial itself to a mere formality.”127 
Thus, the “crucial point” is when the defendant “finds himself faced 
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the 
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.”128 The court 
reasoned that because Matteo was confronted with the “organized 
resources of an ongoing police investigation by agents who were well 
aware of his legal representation,” he was entitled to the protection of 
the Sixth Amendment.
129
 
The Seventh Circuit took a related but distinct approach in ruling that 
in the absence of an “initiation of adversary criminal justice 
proceedings” in the normal sense of formal charge or appearance before 
a judge, there is simply a rebuttable presumption against attachment of 
the right.
130
 The defendant may rebut this presumption by showing that 
even though no “formal adversary judicial proceedings” had begun, the 
government had crossed the line from “fact-finder to adversary.”131 The 
court relied on a prior panel decision from within its circuit, which 
explained that the language of the main Supreme Court cases indeed 
listed formal charge and an appearance before a magistrate as examples 
of right-triggering events but was silent on whether that was an 
exhaustive list.
132
 To illustrate its point, that earlier panel decision had 
pointed to language in the Supreme Court’s decision in Maine v. 
Moulton: “Whatever else it may mean, the right . . . means at least that a 
                                                     
127. Id. at 892 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)) (emphasis added).  
128. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).  
129. Id. at 893, 898. Although the court found that the Sixth Amendment protections were 
applicable in this case, they upheld the district court’s decision denying Matteo’s application for a 
federal writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the state court’s decision was “neither contrary to, 
nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.” Id. at 898. 
130. United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992). 
131. Id. In Larkin, the court ruled that Larkin’s participation in a grand jury directed lineup three 
months prior to his indictment did not create a situation that would show that the government had 
crossed the line from fact-finder to adversary. Therefore, this case did not allow Larkin to rebut the 
presumption that the right to counsel did not attach. 
132. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986)).  
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person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial 
proceedings are initiated[.]”133 
The First Circuit has recognized in dicta that the line may not be that 
bright. In Roberts v. Maine,
134
 the court rejected application of the right 
to counsel to a roadside request to take a blood-alcohol test, even where 
the defendant had been denied a request to call his lawyer.
135
 But the 
court took pains to note that it recognized a “possibility” that the right 
could attach before formal charges, indictment, or arraignment, in 
circumstances where the “government had crossed the constitutionally 
significant divide from fact-finder to adversary.”136 These circumstances 
“must be extremely limited”; the court cited as an example only an 
instance where the government intentionally delayed formal charges for 
the purposes of holding a lineup outside the presence of defense 
counsel.
137
 Even the roadside request for a blood-alcohol test in the case 
itself raised a “close[] question[,]” the court held, but was ultimately 
outside the scope of the right to counsel because, until the defendant 
either unlawfully refused the test or took it and failed it, the police could 
not decide whether to bring charges.
138
 Less clear dicta from the Fourth 
Circuit suggests that “the Supreme Court has refused to draw a line at 
indictment to indicate the onset of criminal proceedings” sufficient to 
trigger the right to counsel, but cites only a Supreme Court case stating 
the uncontroversial (and unhelpful) proposition that a preliminary 
hearing can also so serve.
139
 
Finally, there have been several district court rulings that have also 
recognized pre-indictment attachment, specifically in the context of pre-
indictment plea negotiations. The United States Court for the District of 
Delaware acknowledged that there is “a strong argument that the [S]ixth 
[A]mendment right to counsel attaches during plea negotiations which 
occur prior to the commencement of adversary judicial proceedings.”140 
The fact that the government is willing to offer a plea bargain is proof 
                                                     
133. Lane, 804 F.2d at 82 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 160 (1985)) (emphasis in 
Lane).  
134. 48 F.3d 1287 (1st Cir. 1995). 
135. Id. at 1290. 
136. Id. at 1291 (quoting Larkin, 978 F.2d at 969).  
137. Id. (citing Larkin, 978 F.2d at 969); see also Bruce v. Duckworth, 659 F.2d 776, 783 (7th 
Cir. 1981) (same).  
138. Id.  
139. United States v. Burgess, No. 96-4505, 1998 WL 141157, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 1998) (per 
curiam) (citing Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 228 (1977)).  
140. Chrisco v. Sharan, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (D. Del. 1981). 
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that it has “made a commitment to prosecute,” thereby solidifying the 
adverse positions of the government and the defendant “in much the 
same manner as when formal charges are brought.”141 Similarly, the 
Wisconsin Eastern District Court held that “[t]here is support for the 
position that, under certain circumstances, the [S]ixth [A]mendment 
right to counsel attaches prior to the time formal criminal charges have 
been filed.
142
 In United States v. Busse,
143
 the defendant, through 
counsel, engaged in plea negotiations prior to any adversary judicial 
proceedings.
144
 The court reasoned that because the government engaged 
in “pre-charge negotiations,” it had “committed itself to prosecute,” and 
therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel attached.
145
 
C.  A Candid Statement of the Dilemma 
Perhaps the best discussion of the issue comes from the Sixth Circuit 
decision United States v. Moody.
146
 In this pre-indictment plea 
negotiation case, the court read Supreme Court case law as establishing a 
bright-line rule; made clear that it disagreed with such a rule; and 
reluctantly concluded that it was “beyond [the Circuit’s] reach to modify 
this rule, even in this case where the facts so clearly demonstrate that the 
rights protected by the Sixth Amendment are endangered.”147 
The court candidly acknowledged that the prosecutor’s involvement 
in pre-indictment plea negotiations “raises the specter of the unwary 
defendant agreeing to surrender his right to a trial in exchange for an 
unfair sentence without the assurance of legal assistance to protect 
him.”148 Were it not for the delay of the prosecutor in filing charges in 
that case, the court acknowledged, the defendant would have been 
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in responding to the plea 
offer.
149
 Further, by offering a specific plea deal, the prosecutor was 
“committing himself to proceed with prosecution.”150 Thus, the rule it 
was enforcing was “a mere formality” that “exalt[s] form over 
                                                     
141. Id. 
142. United States v. Busse, 814 F. Supp. 760, 763 (E.D. Wis. 1993). 
143. 814 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Wis. 1993). 
144. Id. at 763. 
145. Id. 
146. 206 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2000). 
147. Id. at 614. 
148. Id. at 615.  
149. Id.  
150. Id.  
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substance” and “requires that we disregard the cold reality that faces a 
suspect in pre-indictment plea negotiations.”151 
Turner v. United States,
152
 decided this year, took up the theme.  The 
court acknowledged that “[w]hether they occur before or after the filing 
of formal charges, it is undisputed that the plea negotiation process is 
adversarial by nature and the average defendant is ill equipped to 
navigate the process on his own.”153 They require defendants to 
“navigate the complex web of federal sentencing guidelines, 
computations that confound even those who work with them often.”154 
Thus, the rigid bright-line rule “does not allow for the realities of 
present-day criminal prosecutions.”155 This explains why so many 
circuits have departed from the bright-line rule.
156
 
The Moody opinion correctly grasps the practical realities of pre-
indictment plea bargaining and the need to recognize a right to counsel. 
It also correctly criticizes the bright-line rule as being overly rigid and 
unjust. What it may not correctly do, however, is interpret the language 
of the relevant Supreme Court precedents. 
III.  THE PROPER DIVIDING LINE: INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 
A proper examination of the Supreme Court precedent, aided by an 
analysis of the text of the Sixth Amendment itself and the practical 
realities of the modern criminal justice system, suggests that the better 
dividing line is between instances where the defendant is dealing just 
with law enforcement, and those where the defendant is dealing with 
prosecutors. In the latter case, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
should attach. 
A.  Supreme Court Precedent 
Undoubtedly, there is ample language in the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in recent decades suggesting the existence of an inflexible 
bright-line rule. Kirby and Gouveia contain no shortage of oft-quoted 
                                                     
151. Id. at 615–16. A concurring opinion echoed the majority’s dissatisfaction with what it 
construed to be a rigidly inflexible, unrealistic Supreme Court rule. Id. at 617–18 (Wiseman, J., 
concurring).  
152. 2017 WL 603848 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2017).   
153. Id. at *9.  
154. Id.  
155. Id.  
156. Id. at *7 (citing a draft version of this Article).   
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language suggesting as much,
157
 although they also contain other 
language capable of a more capacious reading.
158
 
Two years after Gouveia, the Court declined to recognize the 
possibility of a pre-indictment right, even when law enforcement was 
actively and improperly keeping a defense lawyer from being able to see 
his client, in order to allow custodial interrogation to occur without the 
assistance of counsel.
159
 The Court once again recited the standard 
language requiring either “formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information or arraignment.”160 Seven years later, the Court 
ruled similarly, allowing information obtained from interrogations 
outside the presence of defense counsel to be used only as it related to 
uncharged offenses.
161
 
But in all these cases, from Kirby onward, whether they involved 
police lineups or interrogations, the defendant faced law enforcement 
officials, not prosecutors.
162
 This is material, when one considers the 
underlying purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Involvement of law enforcement does not by itself demonstrate that “the 
government [is] committed . . . to prosecute,”163 because only a 
prosecutor can make that decision. Thus, law enforcement officials are 
not by themselves empowered to “solidif[y]” the adverse relationship 
between the government and the defendant.
164
 And, obviously, only the 
                                                     
157. See supra section II.A.  
158. See supra section II.B.  
159. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429–31 (1986). See also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 
180 n.16 (1985) (admissions elicited in uncounseled interrogation would be admissible for as-yet-
unindicted offenses and inadmissible for offenses already charged).  
160. Moran, 475 U.S. at 429. On the other hand, the Court explained that the underlying reason 
for the rule was the need to begin the right to counsel protection when “the government’s role shifts 
from investigation to accusation”, when “the assistance of one versed in the ‘intricacies . . . of law’ 
is needed to assure that the prosecution’s case encounters ‘the crucible of meaningful adversarial 
testing.’” Id. at 430–31 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). Arguably, once 
the prosecution engages in plea negotiations with the defendant, these criteria are met. 
161. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does 
not attach until a prosecution is commenced.”). 
162. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 173 (after initial appearance for armed robbery, defendant was 
questioned by detective about a murder); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 163–65 (defendant made 
incriminating statements to cooperating witness prior to being indicted for the new charge); United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 184 (1984) (Sixth Amendment rights did not attach during time 
held in administrative detention unit of federal prison when defendants were held prior to 
indictment); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972) (identification by victim occurred at police 
station shortly after arrest). 
163. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189. 
164. See id. at 189–90 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (describing 
attachment of the Sixth Amendment right when the adverse government-defendant relationship has 
“solidified”)); United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2000) (“There is no question 
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prosecutor can provide “the expert advocacy of the public prosecutor” 
contemplated by the Court, or the “confrontations with the prosecutor” 
that will “settle the accused’s fate.”165 Indeed, in distinguishing the Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right from the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, the Court in Gouveia discussed the underlying purpose of the 
latter as protecting the defendant from “confrontations with the 
prosecutor.”166 
As set out above,
167
 relevant Supreme Court opinions contain general 
underlying principles describing the reasons for delineating a starting 
point for the right to counsel: confronting the accused with the law’s 
“intricacies” and the prosecutor’s “expert advocacy”; “commit[ing]” to 
prosecution and thus “solidifying” the adverse relationship. The opinions 
then declare a test that attempts to summarize the results flowing from 
those underlying considerations: formal charge or appearance before a 
judge. Where the challenged governmental conduct involves law 
enforcement, the bright-line rule follows nicely from the underlying 
principles. But where the prosecutor is involved, the bright-line rule 
arguably does not. Perhaps the Court was able to use (overly) definitive 
language because it had not yet been forced to face the more difficult 
case, one involving a prosecutor rather than law enforcement, which 
would have required the Court to consider a more expansive statement 
of its test. 
Indeed, Kirby and its pre-2012 progeny could not have faced the more 
difficult case, because in that era, the Court had not yet even recognized 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lawyer incompetence 
causing a defendant to reject a favorable deal. Prior to 2012, the only 
ineffective assistance claims accepted by the Court in the context of plea 
deals were cases where the defense counsel improperly advised his client 
                                                     
in our minds that at formal plea negotiations, where a specific sentence is offered to an offender for 
a specific offense, the adverse positions of the government and the suspect have solidified”). 
Arguably, there may be circumstances where law enforcement agents by themselves could so 
solidify the adverse relationship. Escobedo spoke of the time when the “focus” of law enforcement 
interrogation efforts shifted from a general investigation to obtaining incriminating information 
about the suspect. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). Perhaps Escobedo had it right, 
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions scaling back on the (admittedly fuzzier) “focus” approach 
have it wrong. That question is outside the scope of this Article. What is clear, though, is that as 
between the two, law enforcement has less ability to “solidify” the adverse relationship of the 
parties than the prosecution.  
165. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189–90; see also Moody, 206 F.3d at 614 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying this 
same argument to prosecutor-involved plea negotiations).  
166. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190.  
167. See supra sections II.A and II.B. 
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to accept a plea deal.
168
 In such instances, there will eventually be: (1) 
the filing of charges; and (2) a plea hearing before a judge at which the 
defense lawyer continues to advise his client, either of which suffices to 
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
169
 Thus, it was not even 
possible until 2012 to test the rigidity (or lack thereof) of the supposed 
bright-line rule. 
B. Sixth Amendment Text 
Perhaps more fundamentally, the involvement of a prosecutor may 
answer the concerns based on the text of the Sixth Amendment itself. 
Presumably, prior to an indictment or information, if only law 
enforcement officers are pressing for an admission, lineup, or even plea 
bargain, it is harder to speak of a “criminal prosecution[]” under the 
Amendment’s text, and hence also harder to speak of an “accused.” 
Once a prosecutor has decided to prosecute, and is far enough along to 
engage in plea negotiations, it makes more sense to consider this a 
“criminal prosecution[]”—though, admittedly even then, one can 
plausibly insist that it is not technically a “prosecution[]” until the 
prosecutor files charges. 
Similarly, once the prosecutor is involved, it makes more sense to 
think of the suspect as an “accused.” Indeed, the argument that a pre-
indictment suspect negotiating a plea is an “accused” seems even 
stronger than the argument that such a person is at that point already 
subject to “prosecution[].” “Prosecution” seems more of a technical legal 
term than “accused”: “accused” can apply to persons informally accused 
as literal denotation, whereas the word “prosecution[]” does not 
normally indicate anything other than formal criminal proceedings 
(unless used figuratively). 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “prosecution” as a “criminal 
proceeding in which an accused person is tried,”170 which could be read 
as requiring initiation of formal proceedings, but might also be 
susceptible to a broader reading. Depending on the edition, the 
dictionary defines “accused” far more broadly. One edition defines it as 
                                                     
168. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) (defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
were violated when he accepted plea deal on advice of attorney, but attorney failed to notify him of 
deportation consequence); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (when defendant enters plea of 
guilty on advice of counsel, “the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 
‘was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases’” (citing McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).  
169. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428–29 (1986).  
170. Prosecution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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a “person who has been subjected to actual restraints on liberty through 
arrest or a person against whom a formal indictment or information has 
been returned.”171 This definition allows a mere arrest, without a formal 
charge, to suffice to convert a suspect into an “accused.” Indeed, the 
illustrative example sentence provided specifically contemplates as 
much.
172
 An older version defines it in a similarly broad manner to 
include “the defendant in a criminal case[,]”173 which does not by its 
terms require a formal charge. But the most recent definition supports a 
“bright-line” reading: “someone who has been blamed for wrongdoing, 
especially a person who has been arrested and brought before a 
magistrate or who has been formally charged with a crime (as by 
indictment or information).”174 This seems to track perfectly the 
Kirby/Gouveia/Moran language relied on for the bright-line rule. 
C.  The Arbitrariness of the Bright-Line Rule Where Prosecutors Are 
Involved 
If one says that the right to counsel does not exist in pre-indictment 
plea negotiations involving a prosecutor, then there would be no 
violation even if the prosecutor negotiated directly with a lay defendant 
without any counsel at all—or, for that matter, even if the prosecutor 
deliberately bypassed defense counsel to conduct plea negotiations with 
the lay defendant.
175
 It is one thing to allow interrogation of a pre-
indictment suspect outside the presence of counsel. But when it comes to 
actual negotiations, we properly frown upon a sophisticated prosecutor 
deliberately exploiting a less experienced lay defendant.
176
 
                                                     
171. Accused, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
172. Id. (“[A]lthough Jordan was being vigorously questioned, he did not actually become an 
accused until the officer arrested him”).  
173. Accused, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 39 (4th ed. 1968).  
174. Accused, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
175. This deliberate effort to deal with an uncounseled defendant, even though one is aware that 
defense counsel is available, is similar to the behavior in Moran v. Burbine, except that the behavior 
in Moran involved interrogation, not plea negotiations, and was conducted by law enforcement, not 
prosecutors. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 415–16 (1984). Of course, the prosecutor’s discussion 
of the merits of the case with an adverse party represented by counsel might render the prosecutor 
subject to disciplinary action by the bar. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2014). But the possibility of later disciplinary action for ethics violations is a separate 
issue from the constitutionality of the action. At any rate, it might not constitute an ethics violation, 
depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction. For example, the defense lawyer may represent 
the defendant in other matters, but not yet be definitively retained for the criminal matter at issue. 
For further discussion of Model Rule 4.2 as analogous here, see infra section V.B.  
176. To be sure, any resulting plea agreement ultimately would be examined at a plea hearing, 
and the defendant would have the assistance of counsel at the plea hearing and during the run-up to 
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Consider two cases involving similar charges, offenses, and 
defendants. In both, the prosecutor interrogates the defendant without 
defense counsel present, pressing hard for a tough plea deal, and the 
unsophisticated defendant, overwhelmed by legal complexities, makes 
unnecessary and inadvisable admissions which seal his fate, despite the 
fact that viable defenses exist. In the first case, the prosecutor says, “I 
am going to indict you tomorrow. Agree to this deal right now, or I’m 
sending you up the river.” In the second case, the prosecutor says, “I just 
indicted you yesterday. Agree to this deal right now, or I’m sending you 
up the river.” Under the conventional view, the admissions would be 
admissible at trial in the first case but inadmissible in the second; the 
right to counsel is violated only in the second, and not in the first.
177
 
What principled basis could exist for distinguishing between these 
two situations? In both cases, the “accused is confronted with the 
intricacies of the criminal law[] or with the expert advocacy of the public 
prosecutor.”178 In both cases, the “government has committed itself to 
prosecute,” and “the adverse positions of government and defendant 
have solidified.”179 Both involve “confrontations with the prosecutor” 
which could “settle the accused’s fate.”180 
One might say that in the first case, it was not certain that the 
prosecutor would indict. But that uncertainty hardly lessens the degree to 
which the accused struggles with the law’s intricacies, or the 
prosecutor’s expert advocacy. The distinction has slightly more 
plausibility when one examines the language about whether the 
“government has committed itself to prosecute,” and whether the 
“adverse positions” of the parties have “solidified.” Arguably, until the 
formal charges are actually filed, the government has not “committed” to 
prosecute, and the adverse positions of the parties are not fully “solid[].” 
After all, the prosecutor can always change her mind. 
                                                     
the hearing. But given the dynamics of negotiation, and the difficulty of “walking back” a 
concession made during negotiations once agreed to, one can easily imagine situations where the 
after-the-fact review of the plea deal by defense counsel would be no substitute for having defense 
counsel present during the initial plea negotiations.  
177. To simplify and dramatize, I use a hypothetical where the prosecutor deals directly with an 
uncounseled defendant. But the difference in outcome would obtain just as much if there were a 
negligent, ineffective defense counsel involved in both plea negotiations, with one negotiation 
taking place the day before indictment, and the other the day after.  
178. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 181 (1984); United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 
609, 618 (6th Cir. 2000) (Wiseman, J., concurring) (defendants in the “perilous encounter” of a pre-
indictment plea negotiation “need and should be entitled to counsel in order to navigate these 
troubled waters”).  
179. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189.  
180. Id. at 190. 
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But this argument does not bear close scrutiny. After all, even after a 
prosecutor files an indictment, she can always change her mind and 
dismiss the indictment, thus liquefying the previously solid adverse 
party relationship. As a practical matter, a prosecutor is not likely to 
inform the defendant that she will file charges, or take the time to engage 
in plea negotiations, unless she is relatively certain that charges will be 
filed. And the slight chance that she will change her mind about filing 
does not take away from the fact that at the relevant moment, the 
government has “committed” itself to prosecute, and the adverse 
relations between the parties is pretty solid. 
The distinction is just as arbitrary if we consider cases where the 
defendant is represented by counsel. The Supreme Court has accepted 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims where defense counsel failed to 
inform his client of a favorable plea offer from the prosecution, causing 
the defendant to miss out on the favorable deal.
181
 It has also accepted 
such a claim where the defense counsel improperly advised his client to 
reject a favorable plea deal offer.
182
 One can imagine other situations 
where ineffective assistance relief would be appropriate, such as where 
defense counsel caused his client to unwisely reject a plea offer by 
improperly characterizing the nature of the offer or the legal 
consequences it would trigger. Regardless of the nature of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it seems arbitrary to say it is a constitutional 
violation if it takes place during a plea negotiation the day after 
indictment, but not if it takes place two days before.
183
 
Of course, any bright-line rule can be accused of arbitrariness, if you 
imagine roughly comparable situations that straddle the bright line. That 
is the inherent vice of bright lines. The inherent virtue is that they 
provide clarity, consistency, predictability, and ease of application.
184
 
Such bright line rules are particularly useful in criminal procedure, 
where the doctrine has gotten very complex, and is often to be 
implemented by non-lawyer law enforcement officials who must make 
quick judgments on the spot.
185
 But this “judgment on the fly“ rationale 
                                                     
181. Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012).  
182. Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1280 (2012).  
183. See Moody, 206 F.3d at 615 (noting that pre-indictment plea bargaining with uncounseled 
defendants “raises the specter of the unwary defendant agreeing to surrender his right to trial in 
exchange for an unfair sentence without the assurance of legal assistance to protect him”).  
184. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007) (stating that without 
bright-line rules, “[I]t is often unfair, and consequently impractical, for enforcement officials to 
bring criminal proceedings”). 
185. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (applying a bright-line rule 
for the Fourth Amendment. It is also useful when trying to educate the public about their rights.). 
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is more persuasive in the context of police officers doing searches in the 
field, as opposed to detectives who may have time to consult counsel 
before initiating a custodial interrogation or lineup. 
D. A Proposed Rule 
1. Generally 
Based on the above, one can derive a rule governing the attachment of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Such a rule would continue to 
provide that the filing by a prosecutor of formal charges such as 
indictment, information, or complaint, as well as the appearance of the 
defendant before a magistrate on the charge in question, would suffice to 
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  But the new rule would 
also include those instances in which a prosecutor has contact with a 
suspect about the substance of the case (other than as a witness), either 
directly or through counsel. 
This rule avoids the arbitrariness and injustice described above, and 
better furthers the underlying purposes of the right as articulated by the 
Supreme Court.
186
 But it still retains most of the clarity and ease of 
application of the bright-line rule. 
This rule would reach plea bargaining situations, for the reasons 
discussed above. It might also apply to other types of negotiations, such 
as negotiations on cooperating with the investigation in exchange for 
immunity; negotiations on the surrender of a wanted person; 
negotiations on the turning over of potentially incriminating evidence; 
and negotiations on the terms under which someone will take the police 
to point out something (like the location of a body). The rule would also 
apply to communications concerning the grand jury testimony of the 
suspect, or depositions taken in preparation for trial pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 15. An attorney’s help is needed in trying to 
decide whether to testify at grand jury, or whether to assert the Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination privilege during grand jury or deposition 
testimony. 
In many instances, these situations arise after a formal charge has 
been filed, and the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
is not at issue. But the presence or absence of a formal charge (or an 
                                                     
When teaching law students about the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, it is easy to 
be able to say that, absent an appearance before a judge on the crime in question, or the filing of an 
indictment, information, or criminal complaint, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
186. See supra section I.B.  
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appearance by the defendant before a magistrate) should not be 
controlling. Even absent a formal charge, where the prosecutor 
communicates with a suspect about these matters, the Sixth Amendment 
would be interpreted to afford the suspect the right of assistance of 
counsel. Where a defense attorney is involved, but fails to perform with 
reasonable competence, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could 
be asserted. If the prosecutor elicits incriminating statements from the 
defendant during these interactions without counsel present, those 
statements would be inadmissible absent valid waiver. 
This rule would not require that the state actually furnish counsel any 
earlier in the process than it currently does. There is often some period 
of delay between the time an indigent defendant is initially formally 
charged, or arraigned, and the time that the court appoints counsel.
187
 
This time varies widely across jurisdictions.
188
 But it would provide for 
the exclusion of deliberately elicited, uncounseled testimony, and the 
availability of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In other words, 
the rule would simply require that the same consequences flow from 
similar prosecutor-led negotiations and interactions, regardless of 
whether they occurred before or after the formal charge (or first 
appearance before a judge). 
This rule has the advantage of clarity. It does not require the 
balancing of many factors, or a fuzzy “totality of the circumstances” 
approach. Where the prosecutor communicates with the defendant to 
effectuate negotiation, or to discuss formal testimony like a grand jury or 
a deposition, a suspect needs the assistance of counsel, regardless of 
whether the formality of filed charges has occurred. 
2.  Application to Interrogations 
Applying the proposed rule to interrogations is more of a gray area. 
Where the prosecutor communicates with a suspect about the substance 
of the case, the defendant must contend with the “intricacies of the 
criminal law” and the “expert advocacy” of the prosecutor. It may not be 
clear whether that is enough to say that the prosecutor has “committed” 
to prosecute, or whether the adversary relationship has “solidified.” But 
that Supreme Court criterion was always more descriptive than 
functional. Providing the untrained lay defendant with needed assistance 
                                                     
187. Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 334 (2011); 
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (holding that a six-month period between 
initial arrest/incarceration and eventual appointment of counsel was excessive delay).  
188. Colbert, supra note 187, at 334 n.9. 
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on legal complexities, and balancing the unfair advantage an 
experienced prosecutor has in negotiating with unsophisticated 
defendants, are clear, functional goals.  We know what harm is sought to 
be avoided.  But references to an adversary relationship “solidifying” 
because of a “commitment” to prosecute do not clearly indicate what 
harm is sought to be prevented. Rather, it is just another way—a 
metaphorical, imprecise way—of simply restating the fact that the 
prosecution has in fact begun. 
On balance, where the prosecutor grills a suspect to obtain 
admissions, the reasons underlying the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel argue convincingly for attachment of the right. The participation 
of the government’s lawyer—the lawyer responsible for making 
charging decisions, agreeing to plea deals, and presenting the 
government’s case to the court—means that a suspect needs a lawyer’s 
help with the law’s complexities and the superior sophistication of the 
trained, experienced government lawyer. But the underlying reasons for 
the right to counsel would not apply if the prosecutor were merely 
interviewing a potential witness, one who was not a target of the 
investigation. 
Although it is normally law enforcement agents, rather than the 
prosecutor, who conduct witness interviews that are generally 
investigative in nature, there are occasions when a prosecutor may get 
involved. This is particularly the case where a prosecutor is leading a 
high-profile or long-term investigation—for example, into an organized 
criminal enterprise. A prosecutor overseeing such an investigation may 
participate in questioning a witness who is not a target of the 
investigation, rendering the interaction to be more accurately 
characterized as an “interview” rather than an “interrogation.” Requiring 
that all such interviewees be afforded the right to counsel would likely 
be unduly burdensome to the government. One could of course give the 
prosecutor a choice: either arrange for defense counsel, or else let law 
enforcement agents conduct the interview without her. But the presence 
of the prosecutor in witness interviews can add value in some 
circumstances, making it harder to argue that a prosecutor must forego 
this opportunity to avoid the burden of arranging for defense counsel. 
Thus, it would be best to apply the rule only to “interrogations” of 
“suspects,” and not “interviews” of potential “witnesses.” 
The difficulty, of course, is distinguishing between the two scenarios. 
One formulation would be to revive the Escobedo approach, in which 
the right attaches when the “focus” of the investigation turns from 
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general investigation to obtaining evidence against a suspect.
189
 But the 
Court has rejected this formulation in later cases.
190
 And this formulation 
has the disadvantage of being fuzzier and harder to implement than a 
bright-line rule. There are certain definite markers which could serve in 
making the distinction, such as whether the interviewee has received a 
target letter.
191
 But not only would such a marker fail to effectively deal 
with all necessary cases, it would also be subject to manipulation: just as 
a prosecutor might be incentivized to delay formal charges to engage in 
hard bargaining with unsophisticated defendants,
192
 so too might a 
prosecutor be incentivized to delay sending a target letter.
193
 
Ultimately, then, the best dividing line between “interviews” and 
“interrogations” is the one which the Court has long used in other 
contexts: custodial interrogation. The Court has long recognized that 
custodial interrogations are inherently coercive, requiring special 
protections for the unaided suspect.
194
 Where law enforcement has 
enough suspicion regarding a suspect to haul him in for questioning 
against his will, the adversary relationship between government and 
suspect has “solidified,” and it is fair to consider the interviewee an 
“accused.” At this point, there is little doubt that the suspect needs a 
lawyer’s aid to match the legal expertise of the prosecutor. 
This dividing line has the advantage of somewhat harmonizing Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination doctrine with Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel doctrine in the context of interrogations. The patchwork quilt set 
of rules governing interrogations under the Fifth Amendment, Sixth 
Amendment, and Due Process Clause can confuse police, suspects, and 
                                                     
189. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). 
190. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429, 432 (1984) (observing that Escobedo’s 
purpose was “to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination” and holding 
that “the possibility that the encounter [between a suspect and law enforcement] may have 
important consequences at trial, standing alone, is insufficient to trigger Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel”).  
191. A “target letter” is a letter a prosecutor sends to a suspect advising him or her of a pending 
criminal investigation and suggesting that he or she consult with or retain counsel. See Target letter, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). But see United States v. Mansfield, No. 4:14-CR-25-
HLM, 2014 WL 6879054, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2014) (citing United States v. Mshihiri, No. 13-
184(DSD/JJK), 2014 WL 348571, at *9 n.3 (D. Minn. Jan 31, 2014)) (holding that receipt of a 
target letter alone does not trigger Sixth Amendment right to counsel because target letters do not 
initiate formal charges).   
192. See infra Part IV.  
193. The presence of a subpoena would also likely not effectively serve as such a marker because 
subpoenas can be served upon witnesses as well as suspects. 
194. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469–70 (1966); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
428, 442 (2000).   
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courts alike.
195
 At least where a prosecutor is involved, using custodial 
interrogation as a dividing line (even pre-charge) would make the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment-based Miranda 
protections coextensive.
196
 
Any such rule is subject to objections that it would unduly burden the 
prosecution, frustrate the search for truth, and hamper the crime-fighting 
effectiveness of law enforcement. Certainly, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that it does not wish to hamper law enforcement during 
pre-formal charge interrogation.
197
  But the interrogation contemplated 
by these cases is that done by law enforcement officials. Such 
interrogation would not be affected by this proposed rule, which only 
governs the behavior of prosecutors. For interrogation by law 
enforcement, we already have both Miranda (if the suspect is in custody) 
or else generic Due Process Clause considerations (i.e., the “shock the 
conscience” standard) 198 to govern improper behavior. 
3.  Serial State/Federal Prosecutions 
A special note is warranted about the proposed rule’s application to 
cases in which a state prosecution leads to a later federal prosecution on 
the same offense, or vice versa; or similar situations in which a tribal 
prosecution leads to a state or federal prosecution, or vice versa. Such 
                                                     
195. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–12 (1985) (collecting cases standing for 
various constitutional tests regarding the permissibility of use of confessions obtained in custodial 
interrogations at criminal trials). For a scholarly discussion on the conflation of the Fifth 
Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Due Process considerations implicated in custodial 
interrogations, and the need for a clearer rule than case law has given us, see Charles J. Ogletree, 
Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1826, 1831–36 (1987).  
196. Of course, it would not automatically trigger the Fifth Amendment “right to silence” or the 
Fifth Amendment “right to counsel.” The former would need to be affirmatively invoked by the 
suspect saying something equivalent to “I don’t want to answer any more questions.” See Michigan 
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975). The latter would be invoked by the suspect saying the 
equivalent of, “I want my lawyer.” See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (“[A]n 
accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject 
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him”).  
197. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986) (rejecting adoption of a rule requiring 
law enforcement to inform a suspect of an attorney’s attempts to contact the suspect because 
“practical considerations counsel against its adoption”).  
198. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003) (“Convictions based on evidence 
obtained by methods that are ‘so brutal and so offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shock the 
conscience’ violate the Due Process Clause.”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (A suspect in custody 
“must be warned prior to any questioning . . . that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and 
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so 
desires.”). 
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cases are not uncommon.
199
 Often, the first prosecution will be 
concluded, and the second will thereafter commence. Under the “dual 
sovereign” doctrine, such a subsequent prosecution would not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.
200
 A question arises as to whether actions by 
the first prosecutor could trigger right to counsel protections applicable 
to the second prosecution. (For the purposes of simplicity, the first 
prosecution will be assumed to be the state prosecution and the second 
the federal prosecution, although the order could be reversed, and a 
tribal court substituted for either.) 
Under the bright-line rule approach, once the state concludes 
prosecution, the federal prosecutor has complete freedom of action to 
interrogate the defendant, arrange for a lineup, engage in plea 
negotiations and the like, using information obtained from the state 
prosecution, up until the time of the federal indictment or first 
appearance. Indeed, the federal prosecutor can actively participate in 
plea negotiations in the state prosecution, and cooperate in an 
arrangement whereby the state prosecution is dismissed on condition of 
the defendant pleading guilty to an anticipated federal prosecution.
201
 If 
defense counsel in the state case improperly advised the defendant on 
how to respond to the prosecutor, thus prejudicing the defendant in the 
federal case, the bright-line rule would afford no relief, because, despite 
                                                     
199. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 598 (6th Cir. 2007) (federal prosecutors 
indicted defendant for the same charges in federal court that state had charged him with when he 
rejected state’s plea offer, even though he had been unable to fully communicate or plan a defense 
strategy with appointed counsel in crowded, un-private courthouse “bull pen” cell); United States v. 
Mills, 412 F.3d 326, 326–27 (2d Cir. 2005) (after defendant was charged by state authorities, 
federal prosecutors indicted defendant for the same firearms charge based on statements obtained 
from defendant without presence of counsel in investigation of state law charge); United States v. 
Red Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 711–12 (8th Cir. 2002) (after defendant was charged with rape in Rosebud 
Sioux Tribal Court, federal prosecutors indicted defendant for the same alleged offense based on 
statements and DNA evidence obtained without defendant’s counsel present); United States v. 
Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 332–34 (2d Cir. 1999) (defendant indicted on federal charges after related 
state law charges were dismissed “due to evidentiary and speedy trial problems”); United States v. 
Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant indicted on federal firearm charges 
after being arrested on state law firearm charges that were later dropped).  
200. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867 (2016) (explaining dual 
sovereign rule). Under the dual sovereign rule, a federal prosecution can follow a state prosecution 
on the same offense (or vice versa) without violating the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibition on placing someone in jeopardy twice for the same offense, because each prosecution 
comes from a separate sovereign government. Id. Only the occurrence of two consecutive 
prosecutions for the same offense by the same sovereign violates Double Jeopardy. Id. This doctrine 
also applies if one of the sovereign entities involved is a Native American tribal nation. Id. at 1872.  
201. See Brief of Appellant at 9–11, Turner v. United States, No. 15-6060 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 
2016) (describing exactly this situation).  
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the interconnection between the two prosecutions, the second 
prosecution would not yet have formally begun.
202
 
In both of these cases, interaction of the bright line rule with other 
doctrines leads to unsatisfactory results. Would the proposed rule 
address this? As I propose it, the rule would provide that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel would apply in the subsequent federal case 
once the right was triggered in the initial state case.  Otherwise, state law 
enforcement could deliberately violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights to obtain needed information, only to pass the information off to 
federal law enforcement, which would be empowered to use the illicit 
information.
203
 
IV.  POLICY REASONS FOR THE PROPOSED RULE 
A.  Avoids Incentivizing Delay of Formal Charge 
The proposed rule has several policy advantages over the rigid bright-
line rule that currently prevails in most circuits. For one thing, the 
bright-line rule can incentivize the prosecutor to delay indictment to 
engage in hard bargaining with unsophisticated defendants.
204
 Where the 
suspect is indigent or otherwise lacking in privately retained counsel 
prior to the filing of formal charges—in other words, in the vast majority 
of cases
205—the prosecutor will know that waiting to file charges will 
provide the chance to negotiate with an uncounseled suspect. 
                                                     
202. Id.  
203. This is already the rule where one sovereign obtains evidence through a Fourth Amendment 
violation and attempts to pass off such ill-gotten evidence to a different sovereign. See Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (overruling the “silver platter” doctrine, formerly allowing 
such use of Fourth Amendment-violative evidence); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255–56 
(1960) (holding that evidence obtained in an unreasonable search by state officers was to be 
excluded from federal criminal trial). A similar rule should apply with respect to Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel violations. If courts did apply a similar rule forbidding one sovereign to hand over 
Sixth Amendment-violative evidence to another sovereign “on a silver platter,” the same logic 
would argue for a ruling that a prosecutor’s plea negotiations (or similar activity) on behalf of one 
sovereign would trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a subsequent 
prosecution for the same offense by a different sovereign.  
204. See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 617–19 (Wiseman, J., sitting by designation, 
concurring) (making this same observation); id. at 616 (majority noting that “[b]ut for the delay of 
the prosecution in filing charges, [the defendant] clearly would have been entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel”).  
205. In 1998, approximately sixty-six percent of felony defendants in the federal criminal justice 
system and more than eighty percent in the state system were represented by publicly funded 
counsel. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YTS-Y89U] 
(special report).  
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Sometimes, this may result in a plea agreement little different from 
what would have resulted had a defense lawyer been present. But 
sometimes it will allow the prosecutor to take advantage of an “unwary 
defendant,” and get him to agree to “an unfair sentence.”206 Indeed, pre-
indictment plea negotiations seem to have become more of an issue in 
recent decades.
207
 They are disfavored by some courts, because they 
allow for less supervision by courts and prosecutors’ supervisors, and 
thus can undermine the uniform sentencing goals of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.
208
 
Underscoring this concern is the overwhelming importance of plea 
bargaining in our criminal justice system. The number of cases 
concluded by plea agreements has increased in recent years, rising from 
84 percent in 1990 to 97 percent in 2011.
209
 Currently, approximately 97 
percent of all federal criminal cases, and 93 percent of all state criminal 
cases, are resolved through plea bargain.
210
 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of 
pleas, not a system of trials.”211  Plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to 
the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”212 Thus, in 
today’s criminal justice system, “the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather 
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a 
defendant.”213 
For this reason, the Supreme Court has emphasized the great need to 
ensure that defendants have effective representation by counsel at this 
crucial state.
214
 Therefore, it seems inadvisable to affirm a rule that 
would make the presence or absence of this protection turn on the 
happenstance of whether a formal charge had been filed, or, even worse, 
                                                     
206. Moody, 206 F.3d at 615.  
207. See id. at 617 (Wiseman, J., concurring) (citing criminal justice statistics and law review 
scholarship).  
208. Id.; William L. Gardner & David S. Rifkind, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining 7 CRIM. 
JUST. 14, 16 (1992); (citing David N. Yellen, Comment, Two Cheers for a Tale of Three Cities, 66 
S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569 (1992)).  
209. Gary Fields & Jon R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar as Bargains Trump Trials, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2012, at A1. 
210. Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012) (citing DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TABLE 5.22.2009, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3ZD-
CY83]).  
211. Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012). 
212. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992) (emphasis in original). 
213. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.  
214. See Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1388; Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1407-1408. 
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to allow a prosecutor to game the system by delaying formal charges 
until after initial plea inquiries have been made. 
Similarly, the bright-line rule can also incentivize the prosecutor to 
delay filing charges so as to allow for the interrogation of suspects 
without defense counsel present. The Second Circuit reasoned similarly 
in a case involving a prosecutor who interrogated a defendant 
represented by counsel outside the presence of defense counsel.
215
 
Construing the legal ethics “no-contact” rule to apply pre-indictment as 
well as post-indictment, the court explained, “were we to construe the 
rule as dependent upon indictment, a government attorney could 
manipulate grand jury proceedings to avoid its encumbrances.”216 
B.  Consistency with Ethical Rules 
Allowing the prosecutor to negotiate plea deals with an uncounseled 
defendant, which the bright line rule does, certainly runs against the 
spirit of the policy concerns underlying the right to counsel as articulated 
in Gouveia and related cases. It also runs against the spirit of a lawyer’s 
professional ethical responsibilities.
217
 Prosecutors from nearly all 
states
218
 and the federal government
219
 are bound by some version of the 
American Bar Association’s Model Rule 4.2, which mandates that “a 
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of [a] representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is 
authorized to do so by law or a court order.”220 The purpose of the rule is 
similar to that of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: i.e., to “protect 
a person . . . against possible overreaching by other lawyers, and the 
                                                     
215. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988).  
216. Id. 
217. Cf. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 178 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Model Rule 4.2 
in arguing for broader Sixth Amendment right to counsel protection when uncounseled suspect 
confessed to a crime which was not formally charged, but which was “factually related” to an 
offense formally charged).  
218. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 790 (2009). 
219. See OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 296, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-296-communications-represented-persons-
issues [https://perma.cc/453J-ADVU]. Although in years past the U.S. Justice Department took the 
position that state “no-contact” ethics rules did not apply to federal prosecutors, see, e.g., United 
States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257–58 (8th Cir. 1998), that position was 
ultimately foreclosed by Congress’ 1998 passage of the “McDade Amendment,” providing that 
federal prosecutors were subject to the state and local ethical rules where they practiced. See 28 
U.S.C. § 530B (2012).  
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  
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uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.”221 
The plain language of this well-known, bedrock rule of legal ethics 
makes clear that its application does not require that the party contacted 
by the lawyer be considered to be “adverse.” The Rule does make 
allowances for a prosecutor to contact a party as part of her official 
duties “prior to the commencement of criminal or civil enforcement 
proceedings,” but only for “investigative activities.”222 
Courts have ruled that the ethical “no-contact” rule can, at least in 
some instances, apply to a prosecutor pre-indictment.
223
 Thus, once a 
suspect retains counsel prior to being formally charged, ethical rules can 
in some circumstances prevent the prosecutor from having direct 
communications with the suspect about the case.
224
 Heightening Rule 4.2 
case law’s value as analogy, courts have clarified that “investigative” 
contacts would not violate the Rule, but have stated that adversarial 
contacts would
225—drawing the precise line at issue with respect to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Among the factors weighing in favor 
of applying the rule pre-indictment are the presence of custodial 
interrogation, the initiation of administrative proceedings, and the 
presence of a grand jury investigation of the suspect.
226
 Presently, a 
prosecutor may still employ investigative techniques that are “authorized 
by the law,” even where a defendant is represented by counsel, and the 
government is aware of the representation.
227
 For example, use of 
undercover informants to obtain information is still within the scope of 
permissible investigatory procedures.
228
 The rule applies only to 
                                                     
221. Id. cmt. 1.  
222. Id. cmt. 5.  
223. United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding prosecutors must abide 
by the Model Code of Professional Conduct, even before an indictment, for a rule permitting 
otherwise might incentivize a “government attorney [to] manipulate grand jury proceedings to avoid 
its encumbrances”); United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 
prosecutor’s ethical duties begin “at the latest” at the moment of indictment, and may begin 
beforehand). But see United States v. Ryans, 903 F.2d 731, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
Rule 4.2 does not apply to “the investigative phase of law enforcement”). 
224. See cases cited supra note 223.    
225. See id.  
226. See id.   
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).  
228. See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 516 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming a conviction 
obtained using  evidence obtained by an informant who surreptitiously recorded a suspect who was 
represented by counsel prior to the indictment); United States v. Tracy, No. 96-1100, 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 5352, at *4–6 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 1997) (same); United States v. Worthington, No. 89-
5417, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12838, at *9–11 (4th Cir. July 31, 1990) (same).  
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government attorneys and not government agents broadly.
229
 Being  
represented by counsel alone is not enough to shield a suspect from 
tactics like fake subpoena attachments that help “elicit incriminating 
statements from a suspect.”230 All these factors support crossing the line 
from investigation to accusation. 
Crucially, in the context of custodial interrogation, courts will not find 
a Rule 4.2 violation when the people physically present in the 
interrogation are only law enforcement personnel, or non-lawyer 
confidential informants.
231
 
Many of these applications of Model Rule 4.2 support the proposed 
rule discussed above. The prohibition turns on “investigative” contacts 
developing into non-investigative, adversarial ones. The presence of 
administrative proceedings (analogous to Rule 15 depositions) or grand 
jury proceedings point in favor of adversarial contacts, as does the 
physical presence of the prosecutor. 
Of course, ethical rules governing prosecutor contact with a defendant 
are not coextensive with the analogous Sixth Amendment rules. In some 
cases, Rule 4.2 can provide more protection. The Comments to Model 
Rule 4.2 make clear that “[t]he fact that a communication does not 
violate a state or federal constitutional right is insufficient to establish 
that the communication is permissible under this Rule.”232 Under the 
Sixth Amendment, if the defendant initiates contact with agents of the 
government to discuss his case, they may talk freely with him, whereas 
the Model Rule forbids such communication even if initiated by the 
adverse party represented by counsel.
233
 And the Sixth Amendment rules 
                                                     
229. See United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming a district 
court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress where the defendant cooperated with an I.N.S. 
investigation into his citizenship despite having counsel).  
230. See United States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360, 365 (9th Cir. 2011) (prosecutors provided 
informant with fake documents in order to elicit incriminating statements from defendant); 
Hammad, 858 F.2d at 840 (holding that the prosecutor overstepped the “broad powers of his office” 
when he issued a fake subpoena to “create a pretense that might help the informant elicit admissions 
from a represented suspect”).  
231. United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 593 (2d Cir. 2015) (“legitimate investigative 
techniques” by government officials is “authorized by law” prior to the indictment of a defendant 
who is represented by counsel); Ryans, 903 F.2d at 739 (holding that Model Code DR 7-104(A)(1) 
“was not intended to preclude undercover investigations of unindicted suspects merely because they 
have retained counsel”); United States v. Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1232 (D. Utah 2013) 
(holding that “covert or undercover noncustodial, pre-indictment ex parte contact by law 
enforcement personnel in the investigative phase of a matter is ‘authorized by law’ for purposes of 
the no-contact rule” (emphasis added)). 
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
233. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 790–91 (2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
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apply only after the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches by way 
of, at least, formal charge or appearance before a judge, while the Model 
Rule’s applicability does not depend on the filing of a lawsuit. But the 
ethical rule nonetheless serves as a useful analogy. 
C.  A Limited Effect 
Finally, this rule will not open the floodgates. There is a legitimate 
fear that a rule too expansive will hamper law enforcement, rendering 
ordinary investigative contacts too burdensome. But the proposed rule is 
limited to situations where the prosecutor personally has substantive 
contact about the case with the accused, either directly or through 
counsel. As such, it would not prevent prosecutors from using 
confidential informants and jail plants to interrogate suspects.
234
 Nor 
would it prevent law enforcement agents from interrogating suspects in 
custody, as long as the prosecutor was not involved. Even if the 
prosecutor wanted to be personally involved in a pre-charge 
interrogation as part of an ongoing investigation, the prosecutor would 
merely have to limit personal involvement to noncustodial interrogation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an essential bulwark of fairness 
in our criminal justice system. But it is only as effective as we interpret it. A 
rigid line drawn at formal charge creates arbitrary distinctions; denies 
attorney assistance to those who need it; allows for improper interrogations, 
lineups, and negotiations; incentivizes prosecutors to delay formal charges 
to game the system; and sends the wrong signal about professional ethics 
and the “no contact” rule. These costs are particularly troubling in an era of 
increasing use of pre-indictment plea negotiations. 
None of these costs are offset by the supposed salutary clarity, 
predictability, and administrative ease of the bright-line rule, because there 
is a comparably clear-cut alternative rule that avoids the above evils: 
triggering attachment of the right when a prosecutor engages in substantive 
contact with an accused. Far from being a sacrifice of the black letter law to 
pragmatic demands, such a rule is actually consistent with text and doctrine. 
It has the additional advantage of advancing justice. 
 
                                                     
234. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (“when government intentionally creates a 
situation likely to induce [defendant] to make incriminating statements without the presence of 
assistance of counsel,” the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated.). 
